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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
RA Yl\10ND HIRSCHBACH, 
Appellant and Plaintiff, 
-vs.-
DUBUQUE PACKING CO., 
a corporation, and 
GIFFORD-vVILSON, 
Respondents and Defendants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
FACTS OF THE CASE 
No. 8661 
This appeal is from a Sumnmry Judgment entered 
February 21, 1957, dismissing the Amended Complaint 
of Appellant, hereinafter referred to as Plaintiff (R. 40). 
On May 29, 1956, Plaintiff filed his Amended Com-
plaint alleging that on or about September 5, 1955, on 
U.S. Highway 40-50, a public highway within the State 
of Utah, approximately four n1iles west of I\::nolls, Utah, 
Defendants negligently parked a motor vehicle and as a 
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result a collision occurred, causing damage to Plaintiff's 
motor vehicle in amount $6,921.79, loss of use in amount 
$1,500.00 and damage to cargo in amount $2,399.20 (R. 
9, 10, 11). 
On December 17, preliminary motions having been 
disposed of, Defendants filed their Answer and Counter-
claim admitting the collision but denying the other mate-
rial allegations of the Amended Complaint, alleging 
contributory negligence upon the part of Plaintiff's 
driver and demanding damages by way of counterclaim 
in amount $8,358.27 (R. 24, 25, 26, 27, 28). 
Also on December 17, 1956, Defendants served and 
filed Interrogatories pursuant to Rule 33, t-:-tah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, designed to obtain an admission that 
there wa.s no obstruction to the vision or view of Plain-
tiff's driver at the time he .approached the place where 
Defendants' tractor and trailer were parked (R. 29, 30). 
The Answer to these Interrogatories showed that the 
view of Plaintiff's driver was not obstructed (R. 33). 
On ~ebruary 7, Defendants served their Motion for 
Sumrnary Judgment under Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, upon the ground that as a matter of law 
Plaintiff's driver \Yas negligent and such negligence 
wa.s a proxi1nate can~e of the accident and damage sus-
taine<l by Plaintiff (R. 38). This Inotion was noticed 
for he.aring on February 19, 1956, and in view of the 
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driver, a non-resident, it was agreed between counsel for 
Plaintiff and Defendants that counsel for Plaintiff file 
an affidavit based upon the written statement of Plain-
tiff's driver, in lieu of the driver's affidavit. This agree-
ment was brought to the attention of the Court prior 
to the hearing on Defendants' motion and for purposes 
of the motion the facts summarized in the affidavit were 
taken .as true. From this affidavit the following facts 
appear: 
Immediately prior to the accident, Plaintiff's driver, 
Byers, was proceeding in a westerly direction along U. S. 
Highway 40-50 at approximately 40 miles per hour. It 
was night tirile. The weather was cle.ar and visibility was 
good. The highway wa.s straight, level, dry, black-top 
and in a good condition. It consisted of two lanes 
separated by a painted line. Byers had his driving and 
clearance lights on. His driving lights were sufficient 
to disclose vehicles at a distance of at least 350 feet 
ahead and were functioning properly. Byers' brakes 
were sufficient to stop his truck and trailer within 30 
feet after application at a speed of 20 miles per hour 
and were in good working order. As Byers approached 
the scene of the accident, he observed the clearance 
lights of Defendants' trailer ahead of him. At this time 
Byers could have stopped in time to avoid a collision. 
However, he erroneously concluded that Defendants' 
trailer was moving. He continued to observe the trailer 
as he .approached, but remained under the erroneous 
impression that it was Inoving in the same direction he 
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was. When Byers realized that the trailer was stopped, 
he immediately swerved to the left and endeavored to 
apply his brakes; but he was unable to avoid the collision. 
There were no flares warning of the presence of Defend-
ants' trailer; there was no flagman directing traffic; 
there was no warning of any kind to approaching traffic 
that the trailer was stopped except the n1ere presence 
of the trailer itself (R. 36, 37). 
The Court concluded that Plaintiff's driver was 
guilty of negligence proximately contributing to the acci-
dent as a matter of law under the rule announced in 
Dalley v. Midwestern Dairy Products Co., 80 "Ctah 331, 
15 P.(2d) 309 (1932), and entered judgment dismissing 
plaintiff's Amended Con1plaint, from which judgment 
this appeal is taken. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE 
MOTION OF DEFENDANTS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
ARGUMENT 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE 
MOTION OF DEFENDANTS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
Plaintiff contends that the Dalley Case is not ap-
licable to the facts of this case and, therefore, a genuine 
issue of fact exists relatiYe to the alleged contributory 
negligence of Plaintiff's driver. 
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In the Dalley Case the plaintiff's automobile struck 
.an unlighted truck parked partly upon the traveled por-
tion of the highway. The court said plaintiff either did 
not keep a lookout ahead or if he did he either did not 
heed what he saw or could not see the truck because his 
lights were not such as were prescribed by law-either 
of the.se alternatives constituting negligence as a matter 
of law. In that case, the plaintiff testified that he did not 
see the standing truck until he was within 15 or 20 feet 
of it, that he was then so close that he was unable to 
avoid the collision. 
Citing Nikoleropoulos v. Ramsey) 61 Utah 465, 214 
P. 304 (1923), and OJBrien v. Alston, 61 Utah 368, 213 
P. 791 (1923), the Utah Supreme Court said: 
"In this jurisdiction the doctrine is estab-
lished that it is negligence as a matter of law for 
a person to drive an automobile upon a traveled 
public highway, used by vehicles and pedestrians, 
at such a rate of speed that said automobile can-
not be stopped within a distance at which the 
operator of said car is able to see objects upon the 
highway in front of him." 
It is apparent that in the case now before this Court 
the driver could have stopped within the distance at 
which he was able to see objects upon the highway in 
front of him and hence the very foundation of the Dalley 
Case will not support its application to this case. 
It is believed that a brief resume of the decisions 
considering the Dalley Case may serve to point up the 
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fundamental differences of the case now before this 
Court. 
In Hansen v. Clyde, et al., 89 Utah 31, 56 P. (2d) 
1366 ( 1936), the failure of the plaintiff driver to see 
the barrier which his automobile struck was due to the 
character of his headlights and a curve in the highway. 
Citing the Dalley Case, our Supreme Court said: 
"When a driver upon a public highway with 
his light equipment cannot see more than 50 feet 
ahead of him, it is his duty to drive at such speed 
as will enable him to stop within that distanee." 
The facts alleged in Nielsen v. Watanabe, 90 rtah 
401, 62 P.(2d) 117 (1936), were held not to bring that 
case within the rule of the Dalley Case where the driver 
w.as suddenly and unexpectedly blinded by the head-
lights of an oncoming car. 
A similar result wa.s reached where there was an 
accumulation of sn1oke and n1ist with visibility further 
impaired by the glare of headlights of an approaching 
.automobile . .Lll oss v. Christensen-Gardner, Inc., 98 Utah 
253, 98 P.(2d) 363, (1940). 
In Olson v. Dcnl'er & R.G.Tr.R. Co., et al., 98 Utah 
208, 98 P.(2d) 9±-l: (1940), our Supren1e Court said that 
railroads have a right to presu1ne that 1notorists on cros-
sing streets will proceed carefully and lawfully and will 
drive with their ears in such control as to be able to stop 
within the distance at which they can see objects ahead. 
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Where a bus driver entered a patch of dense fog 
suddenly, it was held that he was not guilty of negligence 
as a matter of law in striking an automobile upon th8 
highway in Trimble, et ux., v. Union Pacific Stages, et al., 
105 Utah 457, 14:2 P.(2d) 674 (1943); and, a curve in 
the road obscuring the obstruction was sufficient to avoid 
application of the Dalley Case in Hodges v. Waite, 2 
Utah (2d) 152, 270 P. (2d) 461, (1954). 
In Wright v. Maynard, 120 Utah 504, 235 P.(2d) 
916 (1951), the court observed that although the driver 
was not able to stop within the distance he could see 
sub.stantial objects in front of him, still he saw them in 
time and had sufficient control of his car to turn aside 
and avoid running into them had they remained station-
ary. The plaintiff, however, moved from his position 
near the door of a stalled car and jumped into the path 
of defendant's car. It was held to be a question for the 
jury to determine whether defendant's inability to stop 
was the proximate cause of the accident or whether that 
cause was the unexpected change of position by plaintiff. 
In Takataro Skiba, et al., v. Weiss, et al., 3 Utah 
( 2d) 256, 282 P. ( 2d) 341 ( 1955), an accident occurred 
on a stretch of highway which was straight and level for 
at least a distance of about one-half mile from the point 
where the collision occurred and since there was no evi-
dence of .any obstructions to the view of the driver, and 
since there was additional evidence of exces.sive speed, 
the court said by way of dictum that the driver of the 
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automobile in striking a truck parked partly on and 
partly off the highway was guilty of negligence as a 
matter of law. This point, however, was not directly 
involved in the appeal. 
In Benson v. Denver & Rio Grande Western R. R. 
Co., et al., 4 Utah (2d) 38, 286 P.(2d) 790 (1955), the 
court reaffirrned the rule announced in Dalley v. Mid-
western Dairy Products Co., in its identical language: 
"In this jurisdiction the doctrine is estab-
lished that it is negligence as a matter of law for 
a person to drive an automobile upon a traveled 
public highway, used by vehicles and pedestrians, 
at such a rate of .speed that said automobile can-
not be stopped within the distance at which the 
operator of said car is able to see objects upon 
the highway in front of him." 
The facts bringing the Ben.son Case within the rule of 
the Dalley Case were the admissions of the plaintiff 
that he was traveling at a speed at which he could not 
stop his automobile within the distance of visibility. 
The Dalley rule was again applied in Fretz v. Ander-
son, 5 Utah (2d) 290, 300 P. (2d) 642 (1956), where an 
overturned aut01nobile was observed on the east half 
of a paved road b~r a Ringsby truck driver who was 
traveling south on the west half of the paven1ent. The 
truck driver stopped a short distance beyond the wreck 
and parked partly on the west shoulder. While he was 
preparing to set out flares, plaintiff, driving north, 
s1nashed into the dmnaged car apparently because of 
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being temporarily blinded by the lights of the truck. 
In holding the negligence of the plaintiff to be for the 
jury the court said : 
"The rule that a motorist is normally required 
to so operate his machine as to be able to see 
and avoid substantial discernible object~ in the 
road ahead is generally recognized, as is its con-
commitant that the motorist must equip his ma-
chine with proper headlights and be able to stop 
within the distance of the lights' projection. How-
ever, this does not mean that a motorist striking 
an object in the highway is guilty of negligence 
as a matter of law under any and all conditions. 
The case of Dalley v. Midwestern Dairy Products 
Co., 80 Utah 331, 15 P.(2d) 309 upon which appel-
lant relies merely announces that general rule, 
holding that the plaintiff who struck an unlighted 
truck on an unobstructed highway was guilty of 
contributory negligence either in failing to main-
tain the proper lighting equipment or in failing 
to observe what proper lights would have shown." 
These decisions have been briefly summarized to 
illustrate the factual foundation essential for the appli-
cation of the rule. In each of the cases where the rule 
has been applied the driver has been guilty of negligence 
in one or more of these particulars : 
1. Driving at a speed rendering it impossible to 
stop within the range of apparent visibility; or 
2. Failing either to see or heed that which would 
have been visible at a time when a collision could have 
been avoided at the speed then employed; or 
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3. Improper lights or brakes. 
Here, none of these is present. The driver of Plain-
tiff's truck could have stopped within the range of his 
headlights, could have avoided the collision after dis-
covering the presence of Defendants' truck and had his 
truck equipped with proper lights and brake.s. Here, 
~ :Q~yg at most a ~ere error J!l judgment-a matter 
traditionally within the province of the jury. Smith v. 
Bennett, 1 Utah (2d) 224, 265 P. (2d) 401 (1953). 
In the Dalley Case, the parked truck was unlighted; 
here, there were the usual driving lights. This might 
on first impression seem to make Plaintiff's driver all 
the more negligent, yet, on further consideration it is 
obvious that this very fact cau.sed his confusion. 
Where the parked vehicle is unlighted, as in the 
Dalley Case, or is not a vehicle normally found on roads, 
as in the Benson Case, or is not in a normal position, 
as in the Fretz Case, no exercise of judgment is required. 
Defendant.s' truck being in a position normally occupied 
by moving vehicles, lighted in the customary fashion, 
engendered the n1isconception and proximately caused 
the accident. 
It was so held in Davis, et al., vs. Browne, et u.x., 
(Wash., 1944) 147 P.(2d) 263, where suit was brought 
by Davis and others for personal injuries sustained as 
a result of ,a collision between the Davis car and the 
Browne ear. rl,he road where the collision occurred was 
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straight and level; the Browne car was stopped in the 
middle of the yellow line dividing the two northerly 
lanes for the purpose of a change of seats and drivers. 
The tail lights of the car were aglow as were the head-
lights. The Davis car approached from the same direc-
tion at a speed of 35 to 40 miles per hour. The driver 
observed the Browne car at a distance which he estimated 
to be 500 feet. He thought the car was moving and veered 
slightly to the left with the apparent intention of passing 
the Browne car. When about 100 feet from the Browne 
car he realized that it was not in motion and immediately 
applied his brakes and swerved to the left to .avoid a 
collision. The right front end of the Davis car struck 
the left rear end of the Browne car. In affirming a 
judgment for the plaintiffs the Supreme Court of Wash-
ington said : 
"The mere fact that Davis did not realize 
that the Browne car was stationary upon the high-
way until he himself was within approximately 
one hundred feet of it cannot be said to constitute 
negligence on his part regardless of all other cir-
cumstances. It was, of course, his duty to exer-
cise reasonable care, under the existing circum-
stances, to observe the presence of the automobile 
ahead of him and avoid coming in contact with 
it. At the same time, he had the right to assume, 
until the contrary became reasonably apparent, 
that other users of the highway would conform 
to the rule:::; of the road, and, likewise, to assume 
that a car ahead of hin1 wa.s in motion rather 
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12 
than that it was standing still in the middle of the 
road contrary to the positive injunction of the 
statute." 
• • • 
"In this instance, Davis was traveling along 
a course and at a rate of speed in conformity to 
law. Seeing the car ahead and thinking it was 
in motion, he veered slightly to his left when two 
hundred fifty feet away, with the evident in-
tention of overtaking and passing that car. Had 
the car ahead been moving, Davis most probably 
would have succeeded in passing it in safety. 
It was not until he was within approximately one 
hundred feet of the Browne car, that either he 
or his companions realized that it was standing 
still. We are unable to say that the trial court 
was in error in refusing to hold that, under the 
existing circumstances, Davis was guilty of negli-
gence in not sooner discovering that the Browne 
car was stationary." 
There was a vigorous dissent in this case by one 
justice who viewed this as an ··assured clear distance 
ahead" case, under a doctrine which had been the law 
of the State of \V ashington since 1920, the doctrine of 
our own Dalley Case. Ebling v. Xielsen, et al., (\Yash., 
1920) 186 P. 887. Thus, in a jurisdiction committed to 
the Dalley rule the error in judgment distinction was 
recognized. To fail to recognize this distinction under 
modern traffic conditions would, to use the words of 
Justice Vvolfe, ·· ... 1nake driving at night on n1uch used 
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arterials practically an in1possibility." Moss v. Chris-
tensen-Gardner, Inc., 98 Utah 253, 98 P.(2d) 363 (1940), 
dissenting opinion. 
Today's traffic realities quite literally require split 
second decisions. A minimu1n legal headlight will disclose 
objects only 350 feet ahead. 41-6-134(a), U. C. A., 1953. 
A minimum legal brake will not stop an automobile going 
at the maximum legal speed at night time of 50 miles 
per hour in less than 250.9 feet, 41-6-144(b), U. C. A., 
1953, leaving only 100 feet for perception time and re-
action time, which, at 50 miles per hour, allows only 
about 1.4 seconds. Perception time and reaction time 
vary from approximately % of one second under day-
light conditions to as much as three seconds under night 
time conditions. Even applying, however, the daylight 
average reaction time as was done in the Benson Case 
reduces the time for Inaking a decision, which could 
perhaps be termed the "judgment time," to approximate-
ly .6 seconds. A person having a three second reaction 
time under night time conditions, of course, would have 
insufficient time to stop, much less for the exercise of 
judgment. 
The time for the exercise of judgment under condi-
tions permissible under the Inotor vehicle code is ex-
ceedingly small and ,a slight indecision, a slight delay, 
an erroneous first impression or a momentary con-
fusion may indeed be fatal. 
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Reasonable minds can differ as to whether such in-
decision, delay or momentary confusion is negligence 
under the circumstances of this case. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellants re.spectfully urge that there was a sub-
stantial question of fact generated by the pleadings, 
Interrogatories, Answer to Interrogatories and Affi-
davit, all before the Court at the time of hearing upon 
Defendants' :Motion for Summary Judgment. This ques-
tion of fact is : Did the failure of Plaintiff's driver to 
perceive that Defendants' truck was stopped on the high-
way, rather than moving, amount to negligence or was 
thi_s an error in judgment consistent with the exercise 
of due care~ This being so, the lower Court erred in 
granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
and dismissing Plaintiff's Amended Complaint with 
prejudice and upon the merits. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SKEEN, "\VORSLEY, SNOvV 
& CHRISTENSEN 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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